SAQL: A Stream-based Query System for Real-Time Abnormal System Behavior
  Detection by Gao, Peng et al.
SAQL: A Stream-based Query System for Real-Time Abnormal System
Behavior Detection
Peng Gao1 Xusheng Xiao2 Ding Li3 Zhichun Li3 Kangkook Jee3
Zhenyu Wu3 Chung Hwan Kim3 Sanjeev R. Kulkarni1 Prateek Mittal1
1Princeton University 2Case Western Reserve University 3NEC Laboratories America, Inc.
1{pgao,kulkarni,pmittal}@princeton.edu 2xusheng.xiao@case.edu 3{dingli,zhichun,kjee,adamwu,chungkim}@nec-labs.com
Abstract
Recently, advanced cyber attacks, which consist of a se-
quence of steps that involve many vulnerabilities and
hosts, compromise the security of many well-protected
businesses. This has led to the solutions that ubiquitously
monitor system activities in each host (big data) as a se-
ries of events, and search for anomalies (abnormal be-
haviors) for triaging risky events. Since fighting against
these attacks is a time-critical mission to prevent further
damage, these solutions face challenges in incorporating
expert knowledge to perform timely anomaly detection
over the large-scale provenance data.
To address these challenges, we propose a novel
stream-based query system that takes as input, a real-
time event feed aggregated from multiple hosts in an
enterprise, and provides an anomaly query engine that
queries the event feed to identify abnormal behaviors
based on the specified anomalies. To facilitate the
task of expressing anomalies based on expert knowl-
edge, our system provides a domain-specific query lan-
guage, SAQL, which allows analysts to express mod-
els for (1) rule-based anomalies, (2) time-series anoma-
lies, (3) invariant-based anomalies, and (4) outlier-based
anomalies. We deployed our system in NEC Labs Amer-
ica comprising 150 hosts and evaluated it using 1.1TB
of real system monitoring data (containing 3.3 billion
events). Our evaluations on a broad set of attack behav-
iors and micro-benchmarks show that our system has a
low detection latency (<2s) and a high system through-
put (110,000 events/s; supporting ∼4000 hosts), and is
more efficient in memory utilization than the existing
stream-based complex event processing systems.
1 Introduction
Advanced cyber attacks and data breaches plague even
the most protected companies [9, 16, 14, 23, 11]. The re-
cent massive Equifax data breach [11] has exposed the
sensitive personal information of 143 million US cus-
tomers. Similar attacks, especially in the form of ad-
vanced persistent threats (APT), are being commonly
observed. These attacks consist of a sequence of steps
across many hosts that exploit different types of vulnera-
bilities to compromise security [25, 2, 1].
To counter these attacks, approaches based on ubiq-
uitous system monitoring have emerged as an impor-
tant solution for actively searching for possible anoma-
lies, then to quickly triage the possible significant risky
events [63, 64, 52, 40, 62, 74, 73, 68]. System monitoring
observes system calls at the kernel level to collect infor-
mation about system activities. The collected data from
system monitoring facilitates the detection of abnormal
system behaviors [39, 66].
However, these approaches face challenges in detect-
ing multiple types of anomalies using system monitor-
ing data. First, fighting against attacks such as APTs
is a time-critical mission. As such, we need a real-
time anomaly detection tool to search for a “needle in a
haystack” for preventing additional damage and for sys-
tem recovery. Second, models derived from data have
been increasingly used in detecting various types of risky
events [66]. For example, system administrators, secu-
rity analysts and data scientists have extensive domain
knowledge about the enterprise, including expected sys-
tem behaviors. A key problem is how we can provide
a real-time tool to detect anomalies while incorporating
the knowledge from system administrators, security ana-
lysts and data scientists? Third, system monitoring pro-
duces huge amount of daily logs (∼50GB for 100 hosts
per day) [69, 88]. This requires efficient real-time data
analytics on the large-scale provenance data.
Unfortunately, none of the existing stream-based
query systems and anomaly detection systems [91, 51,
59, 68] provide a comprehensive solution that addresses
all these three challenges. These systems focus on spe-
cific anomalies and are optimized for general purpose
data streams, providing limited support for users to spec-
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Figure 1: Major types of abnormal system behaviors (e1, . . . ,en are shown in ascending temporal order.)
ify anomaly models by incorporating domain knowledge
from experts.
Contributions: We design and build a novel stream-
based real-time query system. Our system takes as in-
put a real-time event feed aggregated from multiple hosts
in an enterprise, and provides an anomaly query engine.
The query engine provides a novel interface for users to
submit anomaly queries using our domain-specific lan-
guage, and checks the events against the queries to detect
anomalies in real-time.
Language: To facilitate the task of expressing anoma-
lies based on domain knowledge of experts, our sys-
tem provides a domain-specific query language, Stream-
based Anomaly Query Language (SAQL). SAQL pro-
vides (1) the syntax of event patterns to ease the task of
specifying relevant system activities and their relation-
ships, which facilitates the specification of rule-based
anomalies; (2) the constructs for sliding windows and
stateful computation that allow stateful anomaly mod-
els to be computed in each sliding window over the data
stream, which facilitates the specification of time-series
anomalies, invariant-based anomalies, and outlier-based
anomalies (more details in Section 2.2). The specified
models in SAQL are checked using continuous queries
over unbounded streams of system monitoring data [51],
which report the detected anomalies continuously.
Rule-based anomalies allow system experts to spec-
ify rules to detect known attack behaviors or enforce
enterprise-wide security policies. Figure 1 shows an
example rule-based anomaly, where a process (cat) ac-
cesses multiple command log files in a relatively short
time period, indicating an external user trying to probe
the useful commands issued by the legitimate users. To
express such behavior, SAQL uses event patterns to ex-
press each activity in the format of {subject-operation-
object} (e.g., proc p1 write file f1), where system en-
tities are represented as subjects (proc p1) and objects
(file f1), and interactions are represented as operations
initiated by subjects and targeted on objects.
Stateful computation in sliding windows over a data
stream enables the specification of stateful behavior
models for detecting abnormal system behaviors such
as time-series anomalies, which lack support from ex-
isting stream query systems that focus on general data
streams [91, 59, 30, 42]. Figure 1 shows a time-series
anomaly, where a process (sqlservr.exe) transfers ab-
normally large amount of data starting from e2. To fa-
cilitate the detection of such anomalies, SAQL provides
constructs for sliding windows that break the continu-
ous data stream into fragments with common aggrega-
tion functions (e.g., count, sum, avg). Additionally, SAQL
provides constructs to define states in sliding windows
and allow accesses to the states of past windows. These
constructs facilitate the comparison with historical states
and the computation of moving averages such as three-
period simple moving average (SMA) [55].
Built upon the states of sliding windows, SAQL
provides high-level constructs to facilitate the specifi-
cation of invariant-based and outlier-based anomalies.
Invariant-based anomalies capture the invariants during
training periods as models, and use the models later to
detect anomalies. Figure 1 shows an invariant-based
anomaly, where a process (apache.exe) starts an abnor-
mal process (java.exe) that is unseen during the train-
ing period. SAQL provides constructs to define and learn
the invariants of system behaviors in each state computed
from a window, which allow users to combine both states
of windows and invariants learned under normal opera-
tions to detect more types of abnormal system behaviors.
Outlier-based anomalies allow users to identify abnor-
mal system behavior through peer comparison, e.g., find-
ing outlier processes by comparing the abnormal pro-
cesses with other peer processes. Figure 1 shows an
outlier-based anomaly, where a process (sqlservr.exe)
transfers abnormally larger amount of data to an IP ad-
dress than other IP addresses. SAQL provides constructs
to define which information of a state in a sliding window
forms a point and compute clusters to identify outliers.
The flexibility and extensibility introduced by SAQL al-
lows users to use various clustering algorithms for differ-
ent deployed environments.
Execution Engine: We build the query engine on top
of Siddhi [20] to leverage its mature stream management
engine. Based on the input SAQL queries, our system
synthesizes Siddhi queries to match data from the stream,
and performs stateful computation and anomaly model
construction to detect anomalies over the stream. One
major challenge faced by this design is the scalability in
handling multiple concurrent anomaly queries over the
large-scale system monitoring data. Typically, different
queries may access different attributes of the data using
different sliding windows. To accommodate these needs,
the scheme employed by the existing systems, such as
Siddhi, Esper, and Flink [20, 12, 4], is to make copies
of the stream data and feed the copies to each query, al-
lowing each query to operate separately. However, such
scheme is not efficient in handling the big data collected
from system monitoring.
To address this challenge, we devise a master-
dependent-query scheme that identifies compatible
queries and groups them to use a single copy of the
stream data to minimize the data copies. Our system first
analyzes the submitted queries with respect to the tempo-
ral dimension in terms of their sliding windows and the
spatial dimension in terms of host machines and event
attributes. Based on the analysis results, our system puts
the compatible queries into groups, where in each group,
a master query will directly access the stream data and
the other dependent queries will leverage the interme-
diate execution results of the master query. Note that
such optimization leverages both the characteristics of
the spatio-temporal properties of system monitoring data
and the semantics of SAQL queries, which would not be
possible for the queries in general stream-based query
systems [20, 12, 51, 4].
Deployment and Evaluation: We built the whole SAQL
system (around 50,000 lines of Java code) based on the
existing system-level monitoring tools (i.e., auditd [15]
and ETW [13]) and the existing stream management sys-
tem (i.e., Siddhi [20]). We deployed the system in NEC
Labs America comprising 150 hosts. We performed a
broad set of attack behaviors in the deployed environ-
ment, and evaluated the system using 1.1TB of real sys-
tem monitoring data (containing 3.3 billion events): (1)
our case study on four major types of attack behaviors
(17 SAQL queries) shows that our SAQL system has a
low alert detection latency (<2s); (2) our pressure test
shows that our SAQL system has a high system through-
put (110000 events/s) for a single representative rule-
based query that monitors file accesses, and can scale to
∼4000 hosts on the deployed server; (3) our performance
evaluation using 64 micro-benchmark queries shows that
our SAQL system is able to efficiently handle concur-
rent query execution and achieves more efficient mem-
ory utilization compared to Siddhi, achieving 30% aver-
age saving. All the evaluation queries are available on
our project website [19].
Table 1: Representative attributes of system entities
Entity Attributes
File Name, Owner/Group, VolumeID, DataID, etc.
Process PID, Name, User, Cmd, Binary Signature, etc.
Network Connection IP, Port, Protocol
2 Background and Examples
In this section, we first present the background on sys-
tem monitoring and then show SAQL queries to demon-
strate the major types of anomaly models supported by
our system. The point is not to assess the quality of these
models, but to provide examples of language constructs
that are essential in specifying anomaly models, which
lack good support from existing query tools.
2.1 System Monitoring
System monitoring data represents various system activi-
ties in the form of events along with time [63, 64, 52, 60].
Each event can naturally be described as a system entity
(subject) performing some operation on another system
entity (object). For example, a process reads a file or a
process accesses a network connection. An APT attack
needs multiple steps to succeed, such as target discov-
ery and data exfiltration, as illustrated in the cyber kill
chain [28]. Therefore, multiple attack footprints might
be left as “dots”, which can be captured precisely by sys-
tem monitoring.
System monitoring data records system audit events
about the system calls that are crucial in security anal-
ysis [63, 64, 52, 60]. The monitored system calls are
mapped to three major types of system events: (1) pro-
cess creation and destruction, (2) file access, and (3) net-
work access. Existing work has shown that on main-
stream operating systems (Windows, Linux and OS X),
system entities in most cases are files, network connec-
tions and processes [63, 64, 52, 60]. In this work, we
consider system entities as files, processes, and network
connections in our data model. We define an interaction
among entities as an event, which is represented using the
triple 〈subject, operation, object〉. We categorize events
into three types according to the type of their object enti-
ties, namely file events, process events, and network con-
nection events.
Entities and events have various attributes (Tables 1
and 2). The attributes of an entity include the properties
to describe the entities (e.g., file name, process name,
and IP addresses), and the unique identifiers to distin-
guish entities (e.g., file data ID and process ID). The at-
tributes of an event include event origins (i.e., agent ID
and start time/end time), operations (e.g., file read/write),
and other security-related properties (e.g., failure code).
In particular, agent ID refers to the unique ID of the host
where the entity/event is collected.
Table 2: Representative attributes of system events
Operation Read/Write, Execute, Start/End, Rename/Delete.
Time/Sequence Start Time/End Time, Event Sequence
Misc. Subject ID, Object ID, Failure Code
2.2 SAQL Queries for Anomalies
We next present how to use SAQL as a unified interface
to specify various types of abnormal system behaviors.
Rule-based Anomaly: Advanced cyber attacks typi-
cally include a series of steps that exploit vulnerabilities
across multiple systems for stealing sensitive informa-
tion [2, 1]. Query 1 shows a SAQL query for describing
an attack step that reads external network (evt1), down-
loads a database cracking tool gsecdump.exe (evt2
), and executes (evt3) it to obtain database credentials.
It also specifies these events should occur in ascending
temporal order (Line 4).
1 proc p1 read || write ip i1[src_ip != "
internal_address"] as evt1
2 proc p2["%powershell.exe"] write file f1["%gsecdump.
exe"] as evt2
3 proc p3["%cmd.exe"] start proc p4["%gsecdump.exe"] as
evt3
4 with evt1 -> evt2 -> evt3
5 return p1, i1, p2, f1, p3, p4 // p1 -> p1.exe_name,
i1 -> i1.dst_ip, f1 -> f1.name
Query 1: A rule-based SAQL query
Time-Series Anomaly: SAQL query provides the con-
structs of sliding windows to enable the specification
of time-series anomaly models. For example, a SAQL
query may monitor the amount of data sent out by certain
processes and detect unexpectedly large amount of data
transferred within a short period. This type of query can
detect network spikes [24, 26], which often indicates a
data exfiltration. Query 2 shows a SAQL query that mon-
itors network usage of each application and raises an alert
when the network usage is abnormally high. It specifies a
10-minute sliding window (Line 1), collects the amount
of data sent through network within each window (Lines
2-4), and computes the moving average to detect spikes
of network data transfers (Line 5). In the query, ss[0]
means the state of the current window while ss[1] and
ss[2] represent the states of the two past windows respec-
tively (ss[2] occurs earlier than ss[1]). Existing stream
query systems and anomaly systems [51, 59, 30] lack
the expressiveness of stateful computation in sliding win-
dows to support such anomaly models.
1 proc p write ip i as evt #time(10 min)
2 state[3] ss {
3 avg_amount := avg(evt.amount)
4 } group by p
5 alert (ss[0].avg_amount > (ss[0].avg_amount + ss[1].
avg_amount + ss[2].avg_amount) / 3) && (ss[0].
avg_amount > 10000)
6 return p, ss[0].avg_amount, ss[1].avg_amount, ss[2].
avg_amount
Query 2: A time-series SAQL query
Invariant-based Anomaly: Invariant-based anomalies
capture the invariants during training periods as models,
and use the models later to detect anomalies. To achieve
invariant-based anomaly detection, SAQL provides con-
structs of invariant models and learning specifics to de-
fine and learn invariants of system behaviors, which al-
lows users to combine both stateful computation and in-
variants learned under normal operations to detect more
types of abnormal system behaviors [35]. Query 3 shows
a SAQL query that specifies a 10-second sliding window
(Line 1), maintains a set of child processes spawned by
the Apache process (Lines 2-4), uses the first ten time
windows for training the model (Lines 5-8), and starts to
detect abnormal child processes spawned by the Apache
process (Line 10). The model specified in the Lines 5-8
is the set of names of the processes forked by the Apache
process in the training stage. During the online detec-
tion phase, this query generates alerts when a process
with a new name is forked by the Apache process. Gen-
eral stream query systems without the support of stateful
computation and invariant models cannot express such
types of anomaly models. Note that the invariant defini-
tion allows multiple aggregates to be defined.
1 proc p1["%apache.exe"] start proc p2 as evt #time(10
s)
2 state ss {
3 set_proc := set(p2.exe_name)
4 } group by p1
5 invariant[10][offline] {
6 a := empty_set // invariant init
7 a = a union ss.set_proc //invariant update
8 }
9 alert |ss.set_proc diff a| > 0
10 return p1, ss.set_proc
Query 3: An invariant-based SAQL query
Outlier-based Anomaly: Outlier-based anomalies al-
low users to identify abnormal system behavior through
peer comparison, e.g., finding outlier processes by com-
paring the abnormal processes with other peer processes.
To detect outlier-based anomalies, SAQL provides con-
structs of outlier models to define which information in
a time window forms a multidimensional point and com-
pute clusters to identify outliers. Query 4 shows a SAQL
query that (1) specifies a 10-minute sliding window (Line
2), (2) computes the amount of data sent through net-
work by the sqlservr.exe process for each outgoing IP
address (Lines 3-5), and (3) identifies the outliers using
DBSCAN clustering (Lines 6-8) to detect the suspicious
IP that triggers the database dump. Note that Line 6 spec-
ifies which information of the state forms a point and
how the “distance” among these points should be com-
puted (“ed” representing Euclidean Distance). These lan-
guage constructs enable SAQL to express models for peer
comparison, which has limited support from the existing
querying systems where only simple aggregation such as
max/min are supported [51, 20, 12].
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Figure 2: The architecture of SAQL system
1 agentid = 1 // sqlserver host
2 proc p["%sqlservr.exe"] read || write ip i as evt #
time(10 min)
3 state ss {
4 amt := sum(evt.amount)
5 } group by i.dstip
6 cluster(points=all(ss.amt), distance="ed", method="
DBSCAN(100000, 5)")
7 alert cluster.outlier && ss.amt > 1000000
8 return i.dstip, ss.amt
Query 4: An outlier-based SAQL query using clustering
In addition to querying outliers through clustering,
SAQL also supports querying through aggregation com-
parison. For example, in Query 4, replacing the alert
statement with alert ss.amt>1.5*iqr(all(ss.amt))+q3(
all(ss.amt)) gives interquartile range (IQR)-based out-
lier detection [38], and replacing the alert statement
with alert ss.amt>3*stddev(all(ss.amt))+avg(all(ss.amt
)) gives 3-sigma-based outlier detection [38]. SAQL also
supports querying outliers through sorting, and reports
top sorted results as alerts, which is useful in querying
most active processes or IP addresses.
3 System Overview and Threat Model
Figure 2 shows the SAQL system architecture. We de-
ploy monitoring agents across servers, desktops and lap-
tops in the enterprise to monitor system-level activities
by collecting information about system calls from ker-
nels. System monitoring data for Windows, Linux, and
Mac OS are collected via ETW event tracing [13], Linux
Audit Framework [15], and DTrace [8]. The collected
data is sent to the central server, forming an event stream.
The SAQL system takes SAQL queries from users, and
reports the detected alerts over the event stream. The sys-
tem consists of two components: (1) the language parser,
implemented using ANTLR 4 [3], performs syntactic
and semantic analysis of the input queries and generates
an anomaly model context for each query. An anomaly
model context is an object abstraction of the input query
that contains all the required information for the query
execution and anomaly detection; (2) the execution en-
gine, built upon Siddhi [20], monitors the data stream
and reports the detected alerts based on the execution of
the anomaly model contexts.
The execution engine has four sub-modules: (1) the
multievent matcher matches the events in the stream
against the event patterns specified in the query; (2) the
state maintainer maintains the states of each sliding win-
dow computed from the matched events; (3) the concur-
rent query scheduler divides the concurrent queries into
groups based on the master-dependent-query scheme
(Section 5.2) to minimize the need for data copies; (4)
the error reporter reports errors during the execution.
Threat Model: SAQL is a stream-based query system
over system monitoring data, and thus we follow the
threat model of previous works on system monitoring
data [63, 64, 69, 68, 32, 50]. We assume that the system
monitoring data collected from kernel space [15, 13] are
not tampered, and that the kernel is trusted. Any kernel-
level attack that deliberately compromises security audit-
ing systems is beyond the scope of this work.
We do consider that insiders or external attackers have
full knowledge of the deployed SAQL queries and the
anomaly models. They can launch attacks with seem-
ingly “normal” activities to evade SAQL’s anomaly de-
tection, and may hide their attacks by mimicking peer
hosts’ behaviors to avoid SAQL’s outlier detection.
4 SAQL Language Design
SAQL is designed to facilitate the task of expressing
anomalies based on the domain knowledge of experts.
SAQL provides explicit constructs to specify system en-
tities/events, as well as event relationships. This facili-
tates the specification of rule-based anomalies to detect
known attack behaviors or enforce enterprise-wide se-
curity policies. SAQL also provides constructs for slid-
ing windows and stateful computation that allow stateful
anomaly models to be computed in each sliding window
over the data stream. This facilitates the specification
of time-series anomalies, invariant-based anomalies, and
outlier-based anomalies, which lack support from exist-
ing stream query systems and stream-based anomaly de-
tection systems. Grammar 1 shows the representative
rules of SAQL. We omit the terminal symbols.
4.1 Multievent Pattern Matching
SAQL provides the event pattern syntax (in the format
of {subject-operation-object}) to describe system activ-
ities, where system entities are represented as subjects
and objects, and interactions are represented as opera-
tions initiated by subjects and targeted on objects. Be-
sides, the syntax directly supports the specification of
event temporal relationships and attribute relationships,
which facilitates the specification of complex system be-
havioral rules.
Global Constraint: The 〈global cstr〉 rule specifies the
constraints for all event patterns (e.g., agentid = 1 in
Query 4 specifies that all event patterns occur on the
same host).
Event Pattern: The 〈evt patt〉 rule specifies an event
pattern, including the subject/object entity (〈entity〉), the
event operation (〈op exp〉), the event ID (〈evt〉), and the
optional sliding window (〈wind〉). The 〈entity〉 rule con-
sists of the entity type (file, process, network connec-
tion), the optional entity ID, and the optional attribute
constraints expression (〈attr exp〉). Logical operators
(&&, ||, !) can be used in 〈op exp〉 to form complex
operation expressions (e.g., proc p read || write file f
). The 〈attr exp〉 rule specifies an attribute expression
which supports the use of the logical operators, the com-
parison operators (=, ! =, >, >=, <, <=), the arith-
metic operators (+, −, ∗, /), the aggregation functions,
and the stateful computation-related operators (e.g., proc
p[pid = 1 && name = "%chrome.exe"]).
Sliding Window: The 〈wind〉 rule specifies the sliding
windows for stateful computation. For example, #time
(10 min) in Query 2 specifies a sliding window whose
width is 10 minutes. An optional step size can be pro-
vided (e.g., #time(10 min)(1 min) indicates a step size of
1 minute).
Event Temporal Relationship: The 〈temp rel〉 rule
specifies the temporal dependencies among event pat-
terns. For example, evt1->evt2->evt3 in Query 1 spec-
ifies that evt1 occurs first, then evt2, and finally evt3.
Finer-grained control of temporal distance can also be
provided. For example, evt1 ->[1-2 min] evt2 ->[1-2
min] evt3 indicates that the time span between the two
events is 1 to 2 minutes.
Event Attribute Relationship: Event attribute rela-
tionships can be included in the alert rule (〈alert〉)
to specify the attribute dependency of event patterns
(e.g., alert evt1.agentid = evt2.agentid && evt1.dst_id
= evt2.src_id for two event patterns evt1 and evt2 in-
dicates that the two events occur at the same host and
〈saql〉 ::= (〈global cstr〉)* (〈evt patt〉)+ 〈temp rel〉?
〈state〉? 〈groupby〉? 〈alert〉? 〈return〉
〈sortby〉? 〈top〉?
Data types:
〈num〉 ::= 〈int〉 | 〈float〉
〈val〉 ::= 〈int〉 | 〈float〉 | 〈string〉
〈val set〉 ::= ‘(’ 〈val〉 (‘,’ 〈val〉)* ‘)’
〈id〉 ::= 〈letter〉(〈letter〉 | 〈digit〉)*
〈attr〉 ::= 〈id〉 (‘[’ 〈int〉 ‘]’)? (‘.’ 〈id〉)?
Multievent pattern matching:
〈global cstr〉 ::= 〈attr exp〉
〈evt patt〉 ::= 〈entity〉 〈op exp〉 〈entity〉 〈evt〉? 〈wind〉?
〈entity〉 ::= 〈entity type〉 〈id〉 (‘[’ 〈attr exp〉‘]’)?
〈op exp〉 ::= 〈op〉
| ‘!’〈op exp〉
| 〈op exp〉 (‘&&’ | ‘||’) 〈op exp〉
| ‘(’ 〈op exp〉 ‘)’
〈evt〉 ::= ‘as’ 〈id〉 (‘[’ 〈attr exp〉‘]’)?
〈wind〉 ::= ‘#’ 〈time wind〉 | 〈length wind〉
〈time wind〉 ::= ‘time’ ‘(’ 〈num〉 〈time unit〉‘)’
(‘[’〈num〉 〈time unit〉‘]’)?
〈length wind〉 ::= ‘length’ ‘(’ 〈int〉‘)’
〈attr exp〉 ::= 〈attr〉 | 〈val〉
| 〈attr exp〉 〈bop〉 〈attr exp〉
| 〈attr exp〉 (‘&&’ | ‘||’) 〈attr exp〉
| ‘!’〈attr exp〉
| ‘(’ 〈attr exp〉 ‘)’
| 〈attr〉 ‘not’? ‘in’ 〈val set〉
| 〈agg func〉 ‘(’ 〈attr exp〉 (‘,’
〈attr exp〉)*‘)’
| 〈attr exp〉 〈set op〉 〈attr exp〉
| ‘|’ 〈attr exp〉 ‘|’
| 〈peer ref 〉 ‘(’ 〈attr exp〉‘)’
〈temp rel〉 ::= ‘with’ 〈id〉 ((‘->’|‘<-’) (‘[’ 〈num〉 ‘-’
〈num〉 〈time unit〉‘]’)? 〈id〉)+
Stateful computation:
〈state〉 ::= 〈state def 〉 〈state inv〉? 〈state cluster〉?
〈state def 〉 ::= ‘state’ (‘[’ 〈int〉 ‘]’)? 〈id〉 ‘{’
〈state field〉 〈state field〉*‘}’ 〈groupby〉
〈state field〉 ::= 〈id〉 ‘:=’ (〈agg func〉 | 〈set func〉) ‘(’
〈attr〉 ‘)’ 〈groupby〉?
〈state inv〉 ::= ‘invariant’ ‘[’ 〈int〉 ‘]’ ‘[’
〈train type〉 ‘]’? ‘{’ 〈inv init〉+
〈inv update〉+ ‘}’
〈inv init〉 ::= 〈id〉 ‘:=’ (〈num〉|〈empty set〉)
〈inv update〉 ::= 〈id〉 ‘=’ 〈attr exp〉
〈state cluster〉 ::= ‘cluster’ ‘(’ 〈point def 〉 ‘,’
〈distance def 〉 ‘,’ 〈method def 〉 ‘)’
〈point def 〉 ::= ‘points’ ‘=’ 〈peer ref 〉 ‘(’ 〈attr〉 (‘,’
〈attr〉)* ‘)’
〈distance def 〉 ::= ‘distance’ ‘=’ 〈dist metric〉
〈method def 〉 ::= ‘method’ ‘=’ 〈cluster method〉 ‘(’ 〈num〉
(‘,’ 〈num〉)* ‘)’
Alert condition checking:
〈alert〉 ::= ‘alert’ 〈attr exp〉
Return and filters:
〈return〉 ::= ‘return’ 〈res pair〉 (‘, ’ 〈res pair〉)*
〈res pair〉 ::= 〈attr exp〉 (‘as’ 〈id〉)?
〈groupby〉 ::= ‘group by’ 〈attr〉 (‘,’ 〈attr〉)*
〈sortby〉 ::= ‘sort by’ 〈attr〉 (‘,’ 〈attr〉)* (‘asc’ |
‘desc’)?
〈top〉 ::= ‘top’ 〈int〉
Grammar 1: Representative BNF grammar of SAQL
are “physically connected”: the object entity of evt1 is
exactly the subject entity of evt2).
Context-Aware Syntax Shortcuts:
• Attribute inferences: (1) default attribute names will
be inferred if only attribute values are specified in an
event pattern, or only entity IDs are specified in event
return. We select the most commonly used attributes
in security analysis as default attributes: name for files,
exe_name for processes, and dst_ip for network con-
nections. For example, in Query 1, file f1["%gsecdump
.exe"] is equivalent to file f1[name="%gsecdump.exe"],
and return p1 is equivalent to return p1.exe_name; (2)
id will be used as default attribute if only entity IDs
are specified in the alert condition. For example, given
two processes p1 and p2, alert p1 = p2 is equivalent to
alert p1.id = p2.id.
• Optional ID: the ID of entity/event can be omitted if it
is not referenced in event relationships or event return.
For example, in proc p open file, we can omit the file
entity ID if we will not reference its attributes later.
• Entity ID Reuse: Reused entity IDs in multiple event
patterns implicitly indicate the same entity.
4.2 Stateful Computation
Based on the constructs of sliding windows, SAQL pro-
vides constructs for stateful computation, which consists
of two major parts: defining states based on sliding win-
dows and accessing states of current and past windows
to specify time-series anomalies, invariant-based anoma-
lies, and outlier-based anomalies.
State Block: The 〈state def〉 rule specifies a state block
by specifying the state count, block ID, and multiple state
fields. The state count indicates the number of states for
the previous sliding windows to be stored (e.g., Line 2
in Query 2). If not specified, only the state of the current
window is stored by default (e.g., Line 2 in Query 3). The
〈state field〉 rule specifies the computation that needs to
be performed over the data in the sliding window, and
associates the computed value with a variable ID. SAQL
supports a broad set of numerical aggregation functions
(e.g., sum, avg, count, median, percentile, stddev, etc.)
and set aggregation functions (e.g., set, multiset). After
specifying the state block, security analysts can then ref-
erence the state fields via the state ID to construct time-
series anomaly models (e.g., Line 5 in Query 2 specifies
a three-period simple moving average (SMA) [55] time-
series model to detect network spikes).
State Invariant: The 〈state inv〉 rule specifies invari-
ants of system behaviors and updates these invariants us-
ing states computed from sliding windows (i.e., invari-
ant training), so that users can combine both states of
windows and invariants learned to detect more types of
abnormal system behaviors. For example, Lines 5-8 in
Query 3 specifies an invariant a and trains it using the
first 10 window results.
State Cluster: The 〈state cluster〉 rule specifies clus-
ters of system behaviors, so that users can identify ab-
normal behaviors through peer comparison. The cluster
specification requires the specification of the points us-
ing peer reference keywords 〈peer ref〉 (e.g., all), dis-
tance metric, and clustering method. SAQL supports
common distance metrics (e.g., Manhattan distance, Eu-
clidean distance) and major clustering algorithms (e.g.,
K-means [56], DBSCAN [48], and hierarchical cluster-
ing [56]). For example, Line 6 in Query 4 specifies a
cluster of the one-dimensional points ss.amt using Eu-
clidean distance and DBSCAN algorithm. SAQL also
provides language extensibility that allows other cluster-
ing algorithms and metrics to be used through mecha-
nisms such as Java Native Interface (JNI) and Java Nam-
ing and Directory Interface (JNDI).
4.3 Alert Condition Checking
The 〈alert〉 rule specifies the condition (a boolean ex-
pression) for triggering the alert. This enables SAQL to
specify a broad set of detection logics for time-series
anomalies (e.g., Line 5 in Query 2), invariant-based
anomalies (e.g., Line 9 in Query 3), and outlier-based
anomalies (e.g., Line 7 in Query 4). Note that in addi-
tion to the moving average detection logic specified in
Query 2, the flexibility of SAQL also enables the spec-
ification of other well-known logics, such as 3-sigma
rule [38] (e.g., alert ss.amt>3*stddev(all(ss.amt))+avg(
all(ss.amt))) and IQR rule [38] (e.g., alert ss.amt>1.5*
iqr(all(ss.amt))+q3(all(ss.amt))).
4.4 Return and Filters
The 〈report〉 rule specifies the desired attributes of the
qualified events to return as results. Constructs such as
group by, sort by, and top can be used for further result
manipulation and filtering. These constructs are useful
for querying the most active processes and IP addresses,
as well as specifying threshold-based anomaly models
without explicitly defining states. For example, Query 5
computes the IP frequency of each process in a 1-minute
sliding window and returns the active processes with a
frequency greater than 100.
1 proc p start ip i as evt #time(1 min)
2 group by p
3 alert freq > 100
4 return p, count(i) as freq
Query 5: Threshold-based IP Frequency Anomaly
5 SAQL Execution Engine
The SAQL execution engine in Figure 2 takes the event
stream as input, executes the anomaly model contexts
generated by the parser, and reports the detected alerts.
To make the system more scalable in supporting mul-
tiple concurrent queries, the engine employs a master-
dependent-query scheme that groups semantically com-
patible queries to share a single copy of the stream data
for query execution. In this way, the SAQL system sig-
nificantly reduces the data copies of the stream.
5.1 Query Execution Pipeline
The query engine is built upon Siddhi [20], so that our
SAQL can leverage its mature stream management engine
in terms of event model, stream processing, and stream
query. Given a SAQL query, the parser performs syntac-
tic analysis and semantic analysis to generate an anomaly
model context. The concurrent query scheduler inside
the query optimizer analyzes the newly arrived anomaly
model context against the existing anomaly model con-
texts of the queries that are currently running, and com-
putes an optimized execution schedule by leveraging the
master-dependent-query scheme. The multievent solver
analyzes event patterns and their dependencies in the
SAQL query, and retrieves the matched events by issuing
a Siddhi query to access the data from the stream. If the
query involves stateful computation, the state maintainer
leverages the intermediate execution results to compute
and maintain query states. Alerts will be generated if the
alert conditions are met for the queries.
5.2 Concurrent Query Scheduler
The concurrent query scheduler in Figure 2 schedules
the execution of concurrent queries. A straightforward
scheduling strategy is to make copies of the stream data
and feed the copies to each query, allowing each query
to operate separately. However, system monitoring pro-
duces huge amount of daily logs [69, 88], and such copy
scheme incurs high memory usage, which greatly limits
the scalability of the system.
Master-Dependent-Query Scheme: To efficiently sup-
port concurrent query execution, the concurrent query
scheduler adopts a master-dependent-query scheme. In
the scheme, only master queries have direct access to the
data stream, and the execution of the dependent queries
depends on the execution of their master queries. Given
that the execution pipeline of a query typically involves
four phases (i.e., event pattern matching, stateful com-
putation, alert condition checking, and attributes return),
the key idea is to maintain a map M from a master query
to its dependent queries, and let the execution of depen-
dent queries share the intermediate execution results of
their master query in certain phases, so that unnecessary
data copies of the stream can be significantly reduced.
Algorithm 1 shows the scheduling algorithm:
Algorithm 1: Master-dependent-query scheme
Input: User submitted new SAQL query: newQ
Map of concurrent master-dependent queries:
M = {masQi→{depQi j}}
Output: Execution results of newQ
if M.isEmpty then
return execAsMas(newQ,M);
else
for masQi in M.keys do
covQ = constructSemanticCover(masQi,newQ);
if covQ 6= null then
if covQ 6= masQi then
replMas(masQi,covQ,M);
addDep(covQ,newQ);
return execDep(newQ,covQ);
return execAsMas(newQ,M);
Function constructSemanticCover(masQ,newQ)
if Both masQ and newQ define a single event pattern then
if masQ and newQ share the same event type, operation
type, and sliding window type then
Construct the event pattern cover evtPattCovQ by
taking the union of their attributes and agent IDs
and the GCD of their window lengths;
if Both masQ and depQ define states then
if masQ and depQ have the same sliding
window length and masQ defines a super set
of state fields of depQ then
Construct the state cover stateCovQ by
taking the union of their state fields;
return covQ by concatenating evtPattCovQ,
stateCovQ, and the rest parts of masQ;
return null;
Function execAsMas(newQ,M)
Make newQ as a new master and execute it;
Function addDep(masQ,depQ,M)
Add depQ to the dependencies of masQ;
Function replMas(oldMasQ,newMasQ,M)
Replace the old master oldMasQ with the new master
newMasQ and update dependencies;
Function execDep(depQ,masQ)
if depQ == masQ then
return execution results of masQ;
else if Both masQ and depQ define states then
if masQ and depQ have the same sliding window length
and masQ defines a super set of state fields of depQ
then
Fetch the state aggregation results of masQ,
enforce additional filters, and feed into the
execution pipeline of depQ;
else
Fetch the matched events of masQ, enforce additional
filters, and feed into the execution pipeline of depQ;
1. The scheme first checks if M is empty (i.e., no con-
current running queries). If so, the scheme sets newQ
as a master query, stores it in M, and executes it.
2. If M is not empty, the scheme checks newQ against
every master query masQi for compatibility and tries
to construct a semantic cover covQ. If the construc-
tion is successful, the scheme then checks whether
covQ equals masQi.
3. If covQ is different from masQi, the scheme updates
the master query by replacing masQi with covQ and
updates all the dependent queries of masQi to covQ.
4. The scheme then adds newQ as a new dependent
query of covQ, and executes newQ based on covQ.
5. Finally, if there are no master queries found to be
compatible with newQ, the scheme sets newQ as a
new master query, stores it in M, and executes it.
Two key steps in Algorithm 1 are
constructSemanticCover() and execDep(). The
construction of a semantic cover requires that (1) the
masQ and depQ both define a single event pattern
and (2) their event types, operation types, and sliding
window types must be the same1. The scheme then
explores the following four optimization dimensions:
event attributes, agent ID, sliding window, and state
aggregation. Specifically, the scheme first constructs
an event pattern cover by taking the union of the two
queries’ event attributes and agent IDs, and taking the
greatest common divisor (GCD) of the window lengths.
It then constructs a state block cover by taking the union
of the two queries’ state fields (if applicable), and returns
the semantic cover by concatenating the event pattern
cover, the state block cover, and the rest parts of masQ.
The execution of depQ depends on the execution of
masQ. If two queries are the same, the engine directly
uses the execution results of masQ as the execution re-
sults of depQ. Otherwise, the engine fetches the interme-
diate results from the execution pipeline of masQ based
on the level of compatibility. The scheme currently en-
forces the results sharing in two execution phases: event
pattern matching and stateful computation: (1) if both
dep and masQ define states and their sliding window
lengths are the same, the engine fetches the state aggre-
gate results of masQ; (2) otherwise, the engine fetches
the matched events of masQ without its further state ag-
gregate results. The engine then enforces additional fil-
ters and feed the filtered results into the rest of the exe-
cution pipeline of depQ for further execution.
6 Deployment and Evaluation
We deployed the SAQL system in NEC Labs America
comprising 150 hosts (10 servers, 140 employee stations;
generating around 3750 events/s). To evaluate the ex-
pressiveness of SAQL and the SAQL’s overall effective-
ness and efficiency, we first perform a series of attacks
based on known exploits in the deployed environment
and construct 17 SAQL queries to detect them. We fur-
ther conduct a pressure test to measure the maximum per-
formance that our system can achieve. Finally, we con-
duct a performance evaluation on a micro-benchmark (64
queries) to evaluate the effectiveness of our query engine
in handling concurrent queries. In total, our evaluations
use 1.1TB of real system monitoring data (containing 3.3
1We leave the support for multiple event patterns for future work
billion system events). All the attack queries are avail-
able in Appendix, and all the micro-benchmark queries
are available on our project website [19].
6.1 Evaluation Setup
The evaluations are conducted on a server with an In-
tel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E1650 (2.20GHz, 12 cores) and
128GB of RAM. The server continuously receives a
stream of system monitoring data collected from the
hosts deployed with the data collection agents. We de-
veloped a web-based client for query submission and de-
ployed the SAQL system on the server for query execu-
tion. To reproduce the attack scenarios for the perfor-
mance evaluation in Section 6.4, we stored the collected
data in databases and developed a stream replayer to re-
play the system monitoring data from the databases.
6.2 Attack Cases Study
We performed four major types of attack behaviors in
the deployed environment based on known exploits: (1)
APT attack [2, 1], (2) SQL injection attack [43, 78], (3)
Bash shellshock command injection attack [7], and (4)
suspicious system behaviors.
6.2.1 Attack Behaviors
APT Attack: We ask white hat hackers to perform an
APT attack in the deployed environment, as shown in
Figure 3. Below are the attack steps:
c1 Initial Compromise: The attacker sends a crafted
email to the victim. The email contains an Excel file
with a malicious macro embedded.
c2 Malware Infection: The victim opens the Excel file
through the Outlook client and runs the macro, which
downloads and executes a malicious script (CVE-
2008-0081 [6]) to open a backdoor for the attacker.
c3 Privilege Escalation: The attacker enters the victim’s
machine through the backdoor, scans the network
ports to discover the IP address of the database, and
runs the database cracking tool (gsecdump.exe) to
steal the credentials of the database.
c4 Penetration into Database Server: Using the creden-
tials, the attacker penetrates into the database server
and delivers a VBScript to drop another malicious
script, which creates another backdoor.
c5 Data Exfiltration: With the access to the database
server, the attacker dumps the database content using
osql.exe and sends the data dump back to his host.
For each attack step, we construct a rule-based
anomaly query (i.e., Queries 7 to 11). Besides, we con-
struct 3 advanced anomaly queries:
 Windows ClientMail Server DB ServerFirewall
Internet
Windows DC
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
Attacker
Figure 3: Environmental setup for the APT attack
• We construct an invariant-based anomaly query
(Query 12) to detect the scenario where Excel executes
a malicious script that it has never executed before:
The invariant contains all unique processes started by
Excel in the first 100 sliding windows. During the
detection phase, new processes that deviate from the
invariant will be reported as alerts. This query can
be used to detect the unseen suspicious Java process
started by Excel (i.e., step c2).
• We construct a time-series anomaly query (Query 13)
based on SMA to detect the scenario where abnor-
mally high volumes of data are exchanged via network
on the database server (i.e., step c5): For every process
on the database server, this query detects the processes
that transfer abnormally high volumes of data to the
network. This query can be used to detect the large
amount of data transferred from the database server.
• We also construct an outlier-based anomaly query
(Query 14) to detect processes that transfer high vol-
umes of data to the network (i.e., step c5): The query
detects such processes through peer comparison based
on DBSCAN. The detection logic here is different
from Query 13, which detects anomalies through com-
parison with historical states based on SMA.
Note that the construction of these 3 queries assumes
no knowledge of the detailed attack steps.
SQL Injection Attack: We conduct a SQL injection at-
tack [54] for a typical web application server configura-
tion. The setup has multiple web application servers that
accept incoming web traffics to load balance. Each of
these web servers connects to a single database server to
authenticate users and serves dynamic contents. How-
ever, these web applications provide limited input saniti-
zation and thus are susceptible to SQL injection attack.
We use SQLMap [22] to automate the attack against
one of the web application servers. In the process of
detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws and taking
over the database server, the attack generates an exces-
sive amount of network traffic between the web appli-
cation server and the database server. We construct an
outlier-based anomaly query (Query 15) to detect abnor-
mally large data transfers to external IP addresses.
Bash Shellshock Command Injection Attack: We con-
duct a command injection attack against a system that in-
stalls an outdated Bash package susceptible to the Shell-
shock vulnerability [7]. With a crafted payload, the at-
tacker initiates a HTTP request to the web server and
opens a Shell session over the remote host. The behav-
ior of the web server in creating a long-running Shell
process is an outlier pattern. We construct an invariant-
based anomaly query (Query 16) to learn the invariant of
child processes of Apache, and use it to detect any un-
seen child process (i.e., /bin/bash in this attack).
Suspicious System Behaviors: Besides known threats,
security analysts often have their own definitions of sus-
picious system behaviors, such as accessing credential
files using unauthorized software and running forbidden
software. We construct 7 rule-based queries to detect a
representative set of suspicious behaviors:
• Forbidden Dropbox usage (Query 17): finding the ac-
tivities of Dropbox processes.
• Command history probing (Query 18): finding the
processes that access multiple command history files
in a relatively short period.
• Unauthorized password files accesses (Query 19):
finding the unauthorized processes that access the pro-
tected password files.
• Unauthorized login logs accesses (Query 20): finding
the unauthorized processes that access the log files of
login activities.
• Unauthorized SSH key files accesses (Query 21): find-
ing the unauthorized processes that access the SSH
key files.
• Forbidden USB drives usage (Query 22): finding the
processes that access the files in the USB drive.
• IP frequency analysis (Query 23): finding the pro-
cesses with high frequency network accesses.
6.2.2 Query Execution Statistics
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the SAQL system in
supporting timely anomaly detection, we measure the
following performance statistics of the query execution:
• Alert detection latency: the difference between the
time that the anomaly event gets detected and the time
that the anomaly event enters the SAQL engine.
• Number of states: the number of sliding windows en-
countered from the time that the query gets launched
to the time that the anomaly event gets detected.
• Average state size: the average number of aggregation
results per state.
The results are shown in Table 3. We observe that:
(1) the alert detection latency is low (≤10ms for most
queries and <2s for all queries). For sql-injection, the
latency is a bit larger due to the additional complexity of
the specified DBSCAN clustering algorithm in the query;
(2) the system is able to efficiently support 150 enterprise
hosts, with < 10% CPU utilization and <2.7GB memory
utilization. Note that this is far from the full processing
power of our system on the deployed server, and our sys-
tem is able to support a lot more hosts (as experimented
Table 3: Execution statistics of 17 SAQL queries for four major types of attacks
SAQL Query Alert Detection Latency Num. of States Tot. State Size Avg. State Size CPU Memory
apt-c1 ≤1ms N/A N/A N/A 10% 1.7GB
apt-c2 ≤1ms N/A N/A N/A 10% 1.8GB
apt-c3 6ms N/A N/A N/A 8% 1.6GB
apt-c4 10ms N/A N/A N/A 10% 1.5GB
apt-c5 3ms N/A N/A N/A 10% 1.6GB
apt-c2-invariant ≤1ms 5 5 1 8% 1.8GB
apt-c5-timeseries ≤1ms 812 3321 4.09 6% 2.2GB
apt-c5-outlier 2ms 812 3321 4.09 8% 2.2GB
shellshock 5ms 3 3 1 8% 2.7GB
sql-injection 1776ms 14 13841 988.6 8% 1.9GB
dropbox 2ms N/A N/A N/A 8% 1.2GB
command-history ≤1ms N/A N/A N/A 10% 2.2GB
password ≤1ms N/A N/A N/A 9% 1.6GB
login-log ≤1ms N/A N/A N/A 10% 2.2GB
sshkey ≤1ms N/A N/A N/A 10% 2.1GB
usb ≤1ms N/A N/A N/A 9% 2.1GB
ipfreq ≤1ms N/A N/A N/A 10% 2.1GB
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Figure 4: Throughput of the SAQL system under differ-
ent CPU utilizations.
in Section 6.3); (3) the number of states and the average
state size vary with a number of factors, such as query
running time, data volume, and query attributes (e.g.,
number of agents, number of attributes, attribute filtering
power). Even though the amount of system monitoring
data is huge, a SAQL query often restricts one or several
data dimensions by specifying attributes. Thus, the state
computation is often maintained in a manageable level.
6.3 Pressure Test
We conduct a pressure test of our system by replicating
the data stream, while restricting the CPU utilization to
certain levels [5]. When we conduct the experiments,
we set the maximum Java heap size to be 100GB so that
memory will not be a bottleneck. We deploy a query that
retrieves all file events as the representative rule-based
query, and measure the system throughput to demon-
strate the query processing capabilities of our system.
Evaluation Results: Figure 4 shows the throughput
of the SAQL system under different CPU utilizations.
We observe that using a deployed server with 12 cores,
the SAQL system achieves a maximum throughput of
110000 events/s. Given that our deployed enterprise en-
vironment comprises 150 hosts with 3750 events gen-
erated per second, we can estimate that the SAQL sys-
tem on this server can support ∼4000 hosts. While such
promising results demonstrate that our SAQL system de-
ployed in only one server can easily support far more
than hundreds of hosts for many organizations, there are
other factors that can affect the performance of the sys-
tem. First, queries that involve temporal dependencies
may cause more computation on the query engine, and
thus could limit the maximum number of hosts that our
SAQL system can support. Second, if multiple queries
are running concurrently, multiple copies of the data
stream are created to support the query computation,
which would significantly compromise the system per-
formance. Our next evaluation demonstrate the impact of
concurrent queries and how our master-dependent-query
scheme mitigates the problem.
6.4 Performance Evaluation of Concurrent
Query Execution
To evaluate the effectiveness of our query engine (i.e.,
master-dependent-query scheme) in handling concurrent
queries, we construct a micro-benchmark that consists
of 64 queries and measure the memory usage during the
execution. We select Siddhi [20], one of the most popu-
lar stream processing and complex event processing en-
gines, for baseline comparison.
Micro-Benchmark Construction: We construct our
micro-benchmark queries by extracting critical attributes
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Figure 8: State aggregation
from the attacks in Section 6.2.1. In particular, we spec-
ify the following four attack categories:
• Sensitive file accesses: finding processes that access
the files /etc/passwd, .ssh/id_rsa, .bash_history, and
/var/log/wtmp.
• Browsers access files: finding files accessed by the
processes chrome, firefox, iexplore, and microsoftedge.
• Processes access networks: finding network accesses
of the processes dropbox, sqlservr, apache, and outlook.
• Processes spawn: finding processes spawn by the pro-
cesses /bin/bash, /usr/bin/ssh, cmd.exe, and java.
We also specify the following four evaluation cate-
gories for query variations, which correspond to the four
optimization dimensions in Section 5.2:
• Event attributes: we vary from 1 attribute to 4 at-
tributes. The attributes are chosen from one of the
attack categories. The default is 4 attributes.
• Sliding window: we vary from 1 minute to 4 minutes.
The default is 1 minute.
• Agent ID: we vary from 1 agent to 4 agents. The de-
fault is to avoid the agent ID specification (i.e., the
query matches all agents).
• State aggregation: we vary from 1 aggregation type to
4 aggregation types, which are chosen from the pool
{count, sum, avg, max}. The default is to avoid the state
specification (i.e., no states defined).
We construct 4 queries for each evaluation category
and each attack category. In total, we construct 64
queries for the micro-benchmark. For each SAQL query,
we construct an equivalent Siddhi query. Note that un-
like SAQL which provides explicit constructs for stateful
computation, Siddhi as well as other stream-based query
systems [20, 12, 51, 4], do not provide the native support
for these concepts, making these tools unable to spec-
ify advanced anomaly models (i.e., time-series anoma-
lies, invariant-based anomalies, outlier-based anoma-
lies). Thus, for the “state evaluation category”, we only
construct Siddhi queries that monitor the same event pat-
tern without stateful computation. Query 6 shows an
example micro-benchmark query for the joint category
“sensitive file accesses & state aggregation”.
1 proc p read || write file f["/etc/passwd" || "%.ssh/
id_rsa" || "%.bash_history" || "/var/log/wtmp"]
as evt #time(1 min)
2 state ss {
3 e1 := count(evt.id)
4 e2 := sum(evt.amount)
5 e3 := avg(evt.amount)
6 e4 := max(evt.amount)
7 } group by p
8 return p, ss.e1, ss.e2, ss.e3, ss.e4
Query 6: Example micro-benchmark query
Evaluation Results: For each evaluation category and
each attack category, we vary the number of concurrent
queries from 1 to 4 and measure the corresponding mem-
ory usage. Figures 5 to 8 show the results. We observe
that: (1) as the number of concurrent queries increases,
the memory usage increases of Siddhi are much higher
than the memory usage increases of SAQL in all eval-
uation settings; (2) when there are multiple concurrent
queries in execution, SAQL require a smaller memory
usage than Siddhi in all evaluation settings (30% aver-
age saving when there are 4 concurrent queries). Such
results indicate that the master-dependent-query scheme
employed in our query engine is able to save memory us-
age by sharing the intermediate execution results among
dependent queries. On the contrary, the Siddhi query en-
gine performs data copies, resulting in significantly more
memory usage than our query engine. Note that for eval-
uation fairness, we use the replayer (Section 6.1) to re-
play a large volume of data in a short period of time.
Thus, the memory measured in Figures 5 to 7 is larger
than the memory measured in the case study (Table 3),
where we use the real-time data streams. Nevertheless,
this does not affect the relative improvement of SAQL
over Siddhi in terms of memory utilization.
7 Discussion
Scalability: The collection of system monitoring data
and the execution of SAQL queries can be potentially par-
allelized with distributed computing. Parallelizing the
data collection involves allocating computing resources
(i.e., computational nodes) to disjoint sets of enterprise
hosts to form sub-streams. Parallelizing the SAQL query
execution can be achieved through a query-based manner
(i.e., allocating one computing resource for executing a
set of queries over the entire stream), a substream-based
manner (i.e., allocating one computing resource for exe-
cuting all compatible queries over a set of sub-streams),
or a mixed manner. Nonetheless, the increasing scale
of the deployed environment, the increasing number of
submitted queries, and the diversity and semantic de-
pendencies among these queries bring significant chal-
lenges to parallel processing. Thus, the adaptation of
our master-dependent-query scheme to such complicated
scenarios is an interesting research direction that requires
non-trivial efforts. In this work, however, we do not en-
able distributed computation in our query execution. In-
stead, we collect system monitoring data from multiple
hosts, model the data as a single holistic event stream,
and execute the queries over the stream in a centralized
manner. Nevertheless, we build our system on top of Sid-
dhi, which can be easily adapted to a distributed mode by
leveraging Apache Storm [27]. Again, we would like to
point out that the major focus of our work is to provide a
useful interface for investigators to query a broad set of
abnormal behaviors from system audit logs, which is or-
thogonal to the computing paradigms of the underlying
stream processing systems.
System Entities and Data Reduction: Our current data
model focuses on files, processes, and network connec-
tions. In future work, we plan to expand the monitoring
scope by including inter-process communications such
as pipes in Linux. We also plan to incorporate finer gran-
ularity system monitoring, such as execution partition to
record more precise activities of processes [74, 75] and
in-memory data manipulations [46, 53]. Such additional
monitoring data certainly adds a lot more pressure to the
SAQL system, and thus more research on data reduction,
besides the existing works [69, 88], should be explored.
Master-Dependent Query: Our optimization focuses
on the queries that share the pattern matching results
and stateful computation results. More aggressive shar-
ing could include alerts and even results reported by the
alerts, which we leave for future work.
Anomaly Models: We admit that while SAQL supports
major anomaly models used in commonly observed at-
tacks, there are many more anomaly models that are
valuable for specialized attacks. Our SAQL now al-
lows easy plugins for different clustering algorithms, and
we plan to make the system extensible to support more
anomaly models by providing interfaces to interact with
the anomaly models written in other languages.
Alert Fusion: Recent security research [77, 45, 85]
shows promising results in improving detect accuracy us-
ing alert fusion that considers multiple alerts. While this
is beyond the scope of this work, our SAQL can be ex-
tended with the syntax that supports the specifications
of the temporal relationships among alerts. More so-
phisticated relationships would require further design on
turning each SAQL query into a module and chaining the
modules using various computations.
8 Related Work
Audit Logging and Forensics: Significant progress
has been made to leverage system-level provenance for
forensic analysis, with the focus on generating prove-
nance graphs for attack causality analysis [74, 75, 63, 64,
32, 69, 88]. Recent work also investigates how to filter
irrelevant activities in provenance graphs [71] and how to
reduce the storage overheads of provenance graphs gen-
erated in distributed systems such as data centers [57].
These systems consider historical logs and their con-
tributions are orthogonal to the contribution of SAQL,
which provides a useful and novel interface for inves-
tigators to query abnormal behaviors from the stream of
system logs. Nevertheless, SAQL can be interoperated
with these systems to perform causality analysis on the
detected anomalies over the concise provenance graphs.
Gao et al. [50] proposed AIQL which enables efficient
attack investigation by querying historical system audit
logs stored in databases. AIQL can be used to investi-
gate the real-time anomalies detected by our SAQL sys-
tem over the stream of system monitoring data. Together,
these two systems can provide a better defense against
advanced cyber attacks.
Security-Related Languages: There exist domain-
specific languages in a variety of security fields that have
a well-established corpus of low level algorithms, such as
cryptographic systems [33, 34, 70], secure overlay net-
works [61, 72], and network intrusions [36, 44, 82, 86]
and obfuscations [47]. These languages are explicitly de-
signed to solve domain specific problems, providing spe-
cialized constructs for their particular problem domain
and eschewing irrelevant features. In contrast to these
languages, the novelty of SAQL focuses on how to spec-
ify anomaly models as queries and how to execute the
queries over system monitoring data.
Security Anomaly Detection: Anomaly detection tech-
niques have been widely used in detecting malware [58,
83, 65, 67], preventing network intrusion [89, 90, 80],
internal threat detection [81], and attack prediction [87].
Rule-based detection techniques characterize normal be-
haviors of programs through analysis and detect un-
known behaviors that have not been observed during
the characterization [49, 58]. Outlier-based detection
techniques [89, 90, 80] detect unusual system behaviors
based on clustering or other machine learning models.
Unlike these techniques, which focus on finding effec-
tive features and building specific models under different
scenarios, SAQL provides a unified interface to express
anomalies based on domain knowledge of experts.
Complex Event Processing Platforms & Data Stream
Management Systems: Complex Event Processing
(CEP) platforms, such as Esper [12], Siddhi [20], Apache
Flink [4], and Aurora [29] match continuously incom-
ing events against a pattern. Unlike traditional database
management systems where a query is executed on the
stored data, CEP queries are applied on a potentially in-
finite stream of data, and all data that is not relevant to
the query is immediately discarded. These platforms
provide their own domain-specific languages that can
compose patterns of complex events with the support
of sliding windows. Wukong+S [91] builds a stream
querying platform that can query both the stream data
and stored data. Data stream management systems [79],
such as CQL [51], manage multiple data streams and
provide a query language to process the data over the
stream. These CEP platforms are useful in managing
large streams of data. Thus, they can be used as a man-
agement infrastructure for our approach. However, these
CEP systems alone do not provide language constructs
to support stateful computation in sliding windows, and
thus lack the capability to express stateful anomaly mod-
els as our system does.
Stream Computation Systems: Stream computation
systems allow users to compute various metrics based
on the stream data. These systems include Microsoft
StreamInsight [31], MillWheel [30], Naiad [76], and
Puma [41]. These systems normally provide a good sup-
port for stateless computation (e.g., data aggregation).
However, they do not support stateful anomaly models
as our SAQL system does, which are far more complex
than data aggregation.
Other System Analysis Languages: Splunk [21] and
Elasticsearch [10] are platforms that automatically parse
general application logs, and provide a keyword-based
search language to filter entries of logs. OSQuery [17,
18] allows analysts to use SQL queries to probe the real-
time system status. However, these systems and the lan-
guages themselves cannot support anomaly detection and
do not support stateful computation in sliding windows.
Other languages, such as Weir [37] and StreamIt [84],
focus on monitoring the system performance, and lack
support for expressing anomaly models.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a novel stream-based query system
that takes a real-time event feed aggregated from differ-
ent hosts under monitoring, and provides an anomaly
query engine that checks the event stream against the
queries submitted by security analysts to detect anoma-
lies in real-time. Our system provides a domain-specific
language, SAQL, which is specially designed to facili-
tate the task of expressing anomalies based on domain
knowledge. SAQL provides the constructs of event pat-
terns to easily specify relevant system activities and their
relationships, and the constructs to perform stateful com-
putation by defining states in sliding windows and ac-
cessing historical states to compute anomaly models.
With these constructs, SAQL allows security analysts to
express models for (1) rule-based anomalies, (2) time-
series anomalies, (3) invariant-based anomalies, and (4)
outlier-based anomalies. Our evaluation results on 17 at-
tack queries and 64 micro-benchmark queries show that
the SAQL system has a low alert detection latency and a
high system throughput, and is more efficient in memory
utilization than the existing stream processing systems.
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Appendix
A SAQL Queries in Attack Cases Study
We present the 17 SAQL queries that we construct in the
case study, which are used detect the four major types of
attack behaviors (Section 6.2.1). For privacy purposes,
we anonymize the IP addresses and the agent IDs in the
presented queries.
A.1 APT Attack
1 proc p1["%smtp%"] read||write ip i1[srcip="XXX" &&
srcport=25 && protocol=6] as evt1[agentid = XXX]
// mail server, SMTP connection from the router
to the mail server
2 proc p2["%imap%"] read||write ip i2[srcip="XXX" &&
srcport=143 && dstip="XXX" && dstport=51962 &&
protocol=6] as evt2[agentid = XXX] // mail server
, IMAP connection from the mail server to the
client
3 proc p3["%outlook%"] read||write ip i3[srcip="XXX" &&
srcport=51960 && dstip="XXX" && dstport=143 &&
protocol=6] as evt3[agentid = XXX] // windows
client, client’s outlook reads email data
4 with evt1 -> evt2 -> evt3
5 return p1, i1, p2, i2, p3, i3, evt1.starttime, evt2.
starttime, evt3.starttime
Query 7: apt-c1
1 agentid = XXX // windows client
2 proc p1["%outlook.exe"] start proc p2["%excel.exe"]
as evt1 // outlook starts excel
3 proc p2 start proc p3["%java.exe"] as evt2 // excel
starts malware (java) process
4 proc p3 start proc p4["%notepad.exe"] as evt3 //
malware (java) starts notepad
5 proc p4 read||write ip i1["XXX"] as evt4 // notepad
connects to the attacker host
6 with evt1 -> evt2 -> evt3 -> evt4
7 return p1, p2, p3, p4, i1, evt1.starttime, evt2.
starttime, evt3.starttime, evt4.starttime
Query 8: apt-c2
1 agentid = XXX // windows domain controller
2 proc p1 read || write ip i1[srcport=445 && dstip="XXX
"] as evt1 // attacker penetrates to the DC host
using psexec protocol
3 proc p2["%powershell.exe"] write file f1["%gsecdump%"
] as evt2 // attacker transfers the DB cracking
tool gsecdump.exe
4 proc p3["%cmd.exe"] start proc p4["%gsecdump%"] as
evt3 // attacker executes gsecdump.exe to dump DB
administrator credentials
5 with evt1 -> evt2 -> evt3
6 return p1, i1, p2, f1, p3, p4, evt1.starttime, evt2.
starttime, evt3.starttime
Query 9: apt-c3
1 agentid = XXX // db server
2 proc p1["%sqlservr.exe"] read||write ip i1[srcip="XXX
" && srcport=1433 && dstip="XXX" && dstport=52038
&& protocol=6] as evt1 // attacker connects to
the SQL server using DB administrator credentials
3 proc p1 start proc p2["%cmd.exe"] as evt2 // SQL
server starts cmd
4 proc p2 read || write file f1["%hwvun.vbs"] as evt3
// cmd writes malware sbblv.exe
5 proc p3["%cscript.exe"] write file f2["%sbblv.exe"]
as evt4
6 proc p4["%sbblv.exe"] start ip i2[srcip="XXX" &&
srcport=61060 && dstip="XXX" && dstport=443 &&
protocol=6] as evt5 // malware connects back to
the attacker host
7 with evt1 -> evt2 -> evt3 -> evt4 -> evt5
8 return p1, i1, p2, f1, p3, f2, p4, i2, evt1.starttime
, evt2.starttime, evt3.starttime, evt4.starttime,
evt5.starttime
Query 10: apt-c4
1 agentid = XXX // db server
2 proc p1["%cmd.exe"] start proc p2["%osql.exe"] as
evt1 // attacker executes osql.exe on the sql
server
3 proc p3["%sqlservr.exe"] write file f1["%backup1.dmp"
] as evt2 // attacker dumps the DB content
4 proc p4["%sbblv.exe"] read file f1 as evt3 // malware
reads the dump
5 proc p4 read || write ip i1[dstip="XXX"] as evt4 //
malware transfers the dump to the attacker
6 with evt1 -> evt2 -> evt3 -> evt4
7 return p1, p2, p3, f1, p4, i1, evt1.starttime, evt2.
starttime, evt3.starttime, evt4.starttime, evt4.
amount
Query 11: apt-c5
1 proc p1["%excel.exe"] start proc p2 as evt #time(5
second)
2 state ss {
3 set_proc := set(p2.exe_name)
4 } group by p1, evt.agentid
5 invariant[100][offline] {
6 a := empty_set
7 a = a union ss.set_proc
8 }
9 alert |ss.set_proc diff a| > 0
10 return p1, evt.agentid, ss.set_proc
Query 12: apt-c2-invariant
1 agentid = XXX // db server
2 proc p write ip i as evt #time(10 min)
3 state[3] ss {
4 avg_amount := avg(evt.amount)
5 } group by p
6 alert (ss[0].avg_amount > (ss[0].avg_amount + ss[1].
avg_amount + ss[2].avg_amount) / 3) && (ss[0].
avg_amount > 10000)
7 return p, ss[0].avg_amount, ss[1].avg_amount, ss[2].
avg_amount
Query 13: apt-c5-timeseries
1 agentid = XXX// db server
2 proc p write ip i as evt #time(1 min)
3 state ss {
4 avg_amount := avg(evt.amount)
5 } group by p
6 cluster(points=all(ss.avg_amount), distance="ed",
method="DBSCAN(1000, 5)")
7 alert cluster.outlier && ss.avg_amount > 1000000
8 return p, ss.avg_amount
Query 14: apt-c5-outlier
A.2 SQL Injection Attack
1 agentid = XXX // sqlserver host
2 proc p["%sqlservr.exe"] read || write ip i as evt #
time(10 min)
3 state ss {
4 amt := sum(evt.amount)
5 } group by i.dstip
6 cluster(points=all(ss.amt), distance="ed", method="
DBSCAN(100000, 5)")
7 alert cluster.outlier && ss.amt > 1000000
8 return i.dstip, ss.amt
Query 15: sql-injection
A.3 Bash Shellshock Command Injection
Attack
1 proc p1["%apache2%"] start proc p2 as evt #time(10 s)
2 state ss {
3 set_proc := set(p2.exe_name)
4 } group by p1
5 invariant[10][offline] {
6 a := empty_set // invariant init
7 a = a union ss.set_proc //invariant update
8 }
9 alert |ss.set_proc diff a| > 0
10 return p1, ss.set_proc
Query 16: shellshock
A.4 Suspicious System Behaviors
1 proc p["%dropbox%"] start ip i as evt
2 return p, i, evt.agentid, evt.starttime, evt.endtime
Query 17: dropbox
1 proc p read || write file f["%.viminfo" || "%.
bash_history" || "%.zsh_history" || "%.lesshst"
|| "%.pgadmin_histoqueries" || "%.mysql_history"]
as evt
2 return p, f, evt.agentid, evt.starttime, evt.endtime
Query 18: command-history
1 proc p read || write file f["/etc/passwd"] as evt
2 return p, f, evt.agentid, evt.starttime, evt.endtime
Query 19: password
1 proc p write file f["/var/log/wtmp" || "/var/log/
lastlog"] as evt
2 return p, f, evt.agentid, evt.starttime, evt.endtime
Query 20: login-log
1 proc p read || write file f["%.ssh/id_rsa" || "%.ssh/
id_dsa"] as evt
2 return p, f, evt.agentid, evt.starttime, evt.endtime
Query 21: sshkey
1 proc p read || write file f[bustype = "USB"] as evt
2 return p, f, evt.agentid
Query 22: usb
1 proc p start ip ipp #time(1 min)
2 group by p
3 alert freq > 100
4 return p, count(ipp) as freq
Query 23: ipfreq
